The Diagnosis of the Psychoses of Young Adults by Skottowe, James Stuart Ian
A THESIS 
ENTITLED
THE DIAGNOSIS OF THE PSYCHOSES OF YOUNG ADULTS
PRESENTED BY
JAMES STUART IAN SKOTTOWE, M.B,,CH.B.,D.P.M.
FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF MEDICINE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW.
*****
ProQuest Number: 13905289
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 13905289
Published by ProQuest LLC(2019). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
1PREFACE.
Close co&peration between psychiatry and general 
medicine is advocated with renewed vigour from time 
to time. This is a wholly desirable thing, provided 
that the essential differences between disorders of 
the individual as a whole and disorders of his 
several organs are kept clearly before one.
At the present time, psychiatry is regarded as 
being but a small portion of the vast ground 
covered by the general physician; and the psychiatrist 
is but a minor officer in the army of specialists - 
this, at least, if the proportion of medical teaching 
allotted to mental disorders be any guide.
With things as they are, it is natural that 
psychiatry should borrow from the field of general 
medicine methods of approach to its problems which 
have stood the test of time. He would be brave 
indeed who would cavil at medicine taking the lead 
with psychiatry meekly seeking such crumbs of wisdom
2as it can. Thus does it come about that people 
are attempting to solve most recondite problems of 
human behaviour by studying the bodily excreta, to 
the exclusion of other less concrete and more elusive 
factors. It is not denied that derangement of the 
physical mechanism of the individual may produce 
aberration of behaviour. Yet, how desperately ill 
a human being may bet sick to the point of death, 
while his intellect remains unc&ded and his 
emotional state one of serenity, fortified by 
hope whose physical basis it would be hard Indeed 
to locate.
What a contrast to this picture are many mental 
hospital patients of long standingr suspicious, 
deluded, estranged from their closest friends, yet 
apparently robust and in good health.
Does it not seem that there must be a wider 
creed than mere mechanism and the consideration 
of ponderable things? Should there not be more 
interplay of all the forces which the human organism 
is called upon to meet; less artificial effort to
3separate the ’physical1 and the ’psychological* 
and to ’pigeon-hole* human nature? In this 
thesis it is sought to show that a wider method 
of approach to psychiatric problems is needed• 
This view has been advocated by Clouston and 
many others since his day; but the fascination 
of modern biochemical methods is so strong that 
the tendency at the present time is to attempt 
to explain behaviour in chemical terms, and to 
neglect the more personal and essentially vital 
as opposed to the mechanistic aspects of the 
individual.
Our thesis, then, is of an essentially 
clinical nature, and deals primarily with the 
methods of approach to certain problems of 
clinical psychiatry rather than with the minute 
technicalities of biochemistry and academic 
psychology,on the one hand,and the nosographical 
quibblings of descriptive clinicians,on the 
other.
The old descriptive methods of Sydenham, 
so firmly entrenched in the field of general
4medicine, must be only part of a wider scheme 
in solving the problems of behaviour which we 
see exemplified in the psychoses of young 
adults •
September,1929•
5SCOPE OP THE THESIS*
Proposition.
The diagnosis of psychoses occurring In 
young adults is possible only when the 
individual case is viewed developmentally in 
all its aspects - physical, psychological 
and environmental.
Definitions of Terms.
Diagnosis? the word is here taken in its 
literal sense - 'to know through' or 'to 
understand' - and not in its commonly accepted 
sense of merely attaching a name to a group of 
symptoms. In speaking of the diagnosis we 
mean the 'understanding' of tendering intelligible* 
of the psychoses.
Psychosis: Hack Tuke defines 'psychoses'
as "the name for mental affections as a class1*; 
but in later years the word has come to have a
more limited meaning.
(2)
Stoddart says, "The psychoses are the true 
insanities'1, and indicates that the principal
6criterion of this class of mental illness is 
that the patient fails to recognize he is ill; 
for example, he accepts hallucinatory experi­
ences as real. It is in this latter restricted 
sense that the word psychoses is used here, 
although we do not entirely agree with Stoddart!s 
definition of it. It is used because it is 
intended specifically to exclude such conditions 
as are now commonly called Neuroses* and 
’psychoneuroses1, and also states of mental 
deficiency.
Young Adults: it is not intended to adhere
with absolute rigidity to a particular age-group, 
but the subjects under consideration are taken as 
those between the approximate ages of 15 and 30 
years. At this period of life one has a greater 
chance of seeing psychoses uncomplicated by such 
conditions as alcoholism, syphilis, arterio­
sclerosis and other diseases of middle and later 
years. It is easy to speculate on physiological 
lines how these conditions may, by their action
7on the brain, bring about changes of behaviour; 
but what of the apparently baffling changes of 
character, the exaggerations of mood, appearing 
like a bolt from the blue in young, apparently 
healthy, subjects? To render them intelligible 
will be the true test of our methods of approach 
to such problems.
Plan.
The thesis, then, resolves itself into the 
following parts
(1) Historical Survey: a study of the
methods of approach used by past and present 
schools of psychiatry.
(2) The Argument? a defence of the dynamic 
viewpoint in psychiatry, consisting of a 
critical review of the method of approach of 
certain schools of thought described in Section I; 
and formulation of terms which are capable of 
rendering intelligible the psychoses of young 
adults.
(3) Clinical Applications: the formulation
of a concrete scheme of approach to the individual
8case; selection of suitable nomenclature; 
illustration with reference to actual cases.
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PART I 
HISTORICAL SURVEY.
The modern period in psychiatry began with
(3)
the work of Pinel and Tuke at the end of the 
18th.Century. They, however, approached mental 
illness largely from the administrative point of 
view; and their work does not, therefore, concern 
the primary objects of this thesis, except in so 
far as it paved the way for better management of 
all types of psychiatric cases. The nosography 
of psychiatry at that time was extremely loose, 
but even then it was believed that mental illness 
was some kind of misunderstood disease. Pinel
and Tuke placed psychotic patients in such an 
environment that physicians were able to approach 
them armed with the methods which Sydenham a 
century before had applied to pure bodily 
disorders^ namely, the careful tabulation of 
symptoms-, in a large number of cases; delineation 
of clinical types and the labelling of new 
individual cases according to their conformity
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with one or other of these types. As was to 
be expected, the application of these methods 
resulted, in the course of time, in the delimitafc 
tion of certain clinical types of mental disorder.
So far as young adults were concerned, one of the 
first groups to be differentiated was that known
as katatonia.
(4)
Kahlbaum in 1874 described a series of 
cases in which mutism, refusal of food, motor 
phenomena, peripheral cyanosis and salivation 
were prominent features. In regard to prognosis, 
however, the substance of Kahlbaum*s statements 
is that **the patient may recover; or, in an 
unfavourable case, the disease terminates in general 
confusion, and at last in actual dementia”. The 
only criterion which he chose for his prognostic 
guidance was whether or not the motor phenomena 
were accompanied by other symptoms, such as 
**excitement of the maniacal kind”, in which case 
he regarded the prognosis as bad.
Kahlbaum* s work was challenged by slglas and
11
Chaslin, who upheld Falret's opinion that
katatonia was a symptom or a group of
symptoms rather than a distinct form of 
(5)
mental disease «
Kahlbaum and Hecker differentiated a
further group of mental illnesses in young
adults, which they called hebephrenia* Hack 
(6)
Tuke states that the essential feature in this 
group of cases was "the intellectual disturbance 
occurring at puberty or immediately after* It 
is more prevalent among girls than boys and may 
be hereditary or caused by masturbation or over­
work” •
Clouston’s "Adolescent Insanity".
T O -------------  ---------------
Clou3ton sought to describe a distinct
form of mental disease which he called 
"adolescent insanity". It would appear that 
this name "adolescent insanity" covered a 
heterogenous group of clinical material which 
has since been subdivided into various clinical
12
types by later writers. Clouston describes
first of all a condition of ”defiance of
parental and school authority with morbid
self-will.......  They” (the patients) ”will
not get up in the morning, nor will they do
any work or they even do daring acts of
destruction, tear books, break furniture,
threaten violence to themselves and others.••
... take to purposeless deceit and lying...
... and yet all the time are not delirious
or maniacal...”. Later - speaking of the
form which adolescent insanity assumes - he
says,”All cases are not alike, but in 78$
of them the symptoms are those of mania ••.
•.. while in the other 22$ the prevailing
c
symptoms are melancholia, delusional or 
stuporose”.
Describing the actual symptoms he says, 
”... ... the ideation is fanciful ... ... 
tending to hypochondriacal notions and 
morbid self-consciousness. Both sexes 
sometimes think themselves in love, the
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object of their affections being strangers or 
nearly so... ... The acute part of the attack 
usually commences with a sense of *bien $tref...
... They are impudent to an insane degree, use 
bad language, and soon their habits change for 
the worse.•• ... The next stage is one of acute 
mania, when the speech becomes incoherent, the 
conduct outrageous and violent and the habits
filthy and degraded......  This acute stage
lasts about a week   but ... ... the patients
have repeated attacks... ... subsiding into a 
lethargic, anergic condition that is of the nature 
of stupor and sometimes simulates secondary 
dementia11.
”... ... the 22$ of cases which do not 
present any symptoms of morbid mental exaltation... 
... are cases of melancholia, delusion or stupor 
from the beginning and remain so... ... There is 
often a confusional, resistive character in the 
melancholia.”
Speaking of prognosis, Clouston says that
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65$ of cases of adolescent insanity recover 
under proper treatment, an exceedingly small 
proportion die, and 15-25$ become incurable*
The ending that is most common, if recovery does 
not take place, is fftypical secondary dementia 
with more or less periodic exacerbations of 
maniacal attacks for the first few years* A 
few end in chronic mania, a few in 'folie 
circulaire* and a few in delusional insanity”.
Clouston appears to have been the first 
psychiatrist to make a real attempt to under­
stand the psychoses of young adults; and to 
him must go the credit for stressing the 
importance of approaching each individual 
case in a really comprehensive way. Although 
he believed in the neuropathological basis of 
mental disorders, he recognized that environment, 
personal, ethical and emotional difficulties, 
upbringing, physical health and occupation all 
played their part in determining the onset of 
the psychoses of adolescence.
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He says, for example,"The Insanity of 
adolescence cannot be properly understood 
without reference to the normal physiology 
and psychology of that period of life • ••
... At adolescence the reasoning faculty 
first acquires backbone, the conscience 
then only assumes real dominance*• • • ••
The emotional nature for the first time 
acquires a leaning towards the other sex*..
*.* The events and possibilities of the 
future are reflected in vague and dreamlike 
longings that have much bliis in them, but not 
a little of seriousness and difficulty... ...
These subtile, complex, and all important 
mental, emotional, volitional and instinctive 
qualities cannot be developed but through 
corresponding structural and trophic develop­
ment in the brain. The higher the function 
the more delicate the structure, and the more 
liable to derangement, therefore... ... The 
machinery ... ... has been preparing during child-
16
-hood, but does not come into actual and full 
working until adolescence# Therefore, this 
period must be a trying time to the brain ...
... a real crisis, just as birth is......  The
physiology of adolescence, its psychology, its 
neurology and its psychiatry must all hang together^ 
being explained and unified by the facts of the 
development of the capacity and desire to propagate 
the species, then going on”#
This, then, was the first attempt to formulate 
an explanation of the problems under consideration# 
Since Cloustonfs day, a tremendous mass of work 
has been done. Much of it has eome from two 
schools. The one founded by Kraepelin is still 
indulging in nosographieal complexities, and is 
making a painstaking effort to explain mental life 
in terms of chemistry. The other, founded by 
Freud, is restricting itself to the purely 
psychological investigation of the inner battle 
of the individual with his instinctive tendencies.
By adopting such restricted modes of approach to
17
a subject which deals essentially with the 
individual as a whole, each of these schools 
lacks a sense of perspective, without udiich 
an intelligible explanation of the psychoses 
of adolescence is impossible.
In spite of the tremendous following which 
these two schools have, the wider mode of 
approach as formulated by Glouston has been 
upheld in more recent times by Bianchi (who, 
like Clouston, was at heart a neuropathologist); 
and (along rather different lines) Adolf Meyer 
(also, at one time, a neuropathologist). Meyer 
contents himself with using broad, biological 
terms in which to explain his cases, and is 
content to keep an open mind as to the ultimate, 
academic, physical basis of such disorders; 
while Bianchi, although wide in his views, tries 
to reduce all psychoses ultimately to neurological 
terms •
Before proceeding with the present-day
18
exponents of t&e wider methods of approach, it 
is necessary to deal with Kraepelin and Freud 
and their followers.
Kraepelin and the Physlogenic School.
Kraepelin1s position in psychiatry may be
compared aptly with that of Sydenham in the
field of general medicine. Dealing, to a
considerable extent, with types of cases which
Clouston had designated !tadolescent insanity”,
he introduced a much more orderly subdivision
of this mass of material than Clouston had done.
By the careful tabulation of symptoms, he was
able to delineate several clinical types, which
he elevated to the position of disease entities.
His first subdivisions were into dementia 
(8) (9)
praecox and manic-depressive insanity •
Into the former category he put all cases 
which ended unfavourably. He found that cases 
which ultimately became demented showed a 
variety of symptoms in their early stages; so
19
he subdivided them into four types: namely, 
simple dementia, hebephrenia, catatonia and 
dementia paranoides, of each of which he gave 
a masterly clinical description. As his 
experience widened, he found that not all cases 
which ended in dementia necessarily conformed 
to one or other of these types, so he introduced 
another class, which he called ”mixed forms”. 
Further, he found that not all cases presenting 
early symptoms of what he called dementia 
praecox necessarily ended in dementia; in 
fact, some of them recovered. The essential 
features upon which Kraepelin made his diagnosis - 
or,rather,labelled his cases - were the presence 
of hallucinations and delusions of an odd or 
bizarre character, together with a giggling, 
silly, emotional state, possibly accompanied by 
curious motor phenomena, such as stereotypy, 
”schnautz krampf”, peripheral cyanosis, resistance 
and negativism. Because a patient presented 
certain symptoms, he was, therefore, suffering
20
from a certain disease, irrespective of the 
setting in which such symptoms occurred, the 
conditions which led up to their appearance 
or the type of personality concerned.
Kraepelin applied the same methods in 
delineating his !lmanie-depressive insanity”.
This he did largely by following up the cases 
which were formerly labelled ’mania1, •melan­
cholia1 and fcircular insanity1. He found 
that in ’circular insanity* were certain 
symptoms also seen in ’mania’ and ’melancholia*, 
and that cases of mania often exhibited at 
another part of their course symptoms of 
melancholia, and vice vers&• These findings 
gave rise to the conception of one disease 
group which he called **manic-depressive insanity”. 
The essential clinical criteria on which he 
diagnosed this group were a mood of elation, 
increased activity, flight of ideas, and 
distractability, or their opposites.
One of the most striking features in these
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two groups (manic-depressive and dementia 
praecox) which Kraepelin demonstrated was 
that in many, if not the majority, of cases 
there was no gross impairment of the purely 
intellectual functions, such as orientation, 
memory and ability to perform simple acts of 
reasoning# For some time it had been 
recognized that disturbance of these functions 
was an essential part of the symptomatology 
of the psychoses associated with gross bodily 
disorders, such as general infections, states of 
exhaustion, disease or injury of the brain 
itself# Kraepelin demonstrated that ps ychoses 
did occur where - in the early stages, at any 
rate - there was no intellectual impairment, 
and he brought out more clearly this valuable 
point in differential diagnosis; namely, the 
careful examination of the intellectual 
functions# In practice, this meant that 
where intellectual impairment was a prominent 
feature of a psychosis, the major cause was to
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be sought for in some gross bodily disturbance; 
whereas, if intellectual impairment was not 
present, then the psychosis was to be regarded, 
in lKraepelinianl terms, as a 1 functional1 one.
It is only just to note, in passing, that,
although Kraepelin*s conceptions of dementia
praecox and manic-depressive insanity are widely
accepted today as a working basis, they were not
allowed to pass unchallenged by other psychiatrists.
Thus, Bianchi regards the cases which Kraepelin
calls dementia praecox as one of the possible end-
(10)
results of 1 sensory insanity1 - a psychosis 
resulting from the gradual dominance of con­
sciousness by a variety of hallucinatory 
experiences.
(11)
Savage and Goodall , criticizing the 
conception of dementia praecox, say "it does not
appear necessary........to remove and group
together under a special designation cases which 
exhibit such features, and which now appear under
23
other headings, such as melancholia, dementia 
stupor”.
As time went on, Kraepelin continued to 
describe more and more clinical subdivisions 
of cases of ”dementia praecox” and "manic- 
depressive insanity^, until, in the last 
editions of his works, these have reached 
bewildering complexity. Thus, he came to 
alter his original classification of the early 
forms of dementia praecox, and finally spoke 
of two "depressive types of dementia praecox” - 
viz., "simple depression or stuporose deteriora­
tion” and "depressive deterioration with 
delusion formation". He spoke also of certain 
"agitated", "circular" and "neriodic" types of 
dementia praecox, and finally a type in which 
"speech confusion” is the cardinal symptom.
These are all in addition to his "simple”, 
"catatonic" and "paranoid" forms. To formulate 
concisely, then, what Kraepelin did for 
psychiatry it may be said that*
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(1) He produced extraordinarily detailed 
clinical descriptions.
(2) He attempted to delineate certain 
clinical types; and he - quite unjustifiably - 
implied that each type was a disease entity.
(3) As his experience wideded, he 
demonstrated - although he did not formulate 
this concept explicitly - that there seems to 
be clinically a graduated scale of cases which, 
at the one end, show symptoms almost exclusively 
corresponding to his ”dementia praecox” type , 
and, at the other end, corresponding to his 
”manic-depressive” type; while in between 
these extremes are cases showing certain 
features of both these alleged disease 
entities. It was these cases in the middle
of the scale which led him to invent such 
names as ”circular” or 11 periodic” types of 
dementia praecox.
Kraepelin did not, however, provide us with 
an understanding of the mental illnesses of
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young adults* On closer inspection, it becomes 
clear that he actually pointed the way for his 
followers, away from the broad, well proportioned 
approach of Clouston*s day; for his final legacy 
to psychiatry was his expressed belief that some 
form of toxaemia - then becoming a fashionable 
way of explaining the misunderstood in general 
medicine - was responsible for dementia praecox 
and the manic-depressive psychosis. On what 
clinical evidence he based this belief it is hard 
to tell. He describes enlargement of the thyroid 
gland, tremor of the fingers, pupillary anomalies, 
low temperature and blood-pressure and wide 
deviations in the pulse-rate; and presumably it 
was because cf these changes that he suggested 
that some toxin was responsible for the disease.
He connected this with the sex glands because the 
disease is so closely associated with adolescence. 
Later, he repudiated this hypothesis in favour of 
one in which a more general metabolic intoxication 
was the fundamental change* This, together with
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the increase of scientific medicine at the close
of the 19th.Century, and the attractive simplicity
of the concept of some concrete, demonstrable
substance being responsible for these psychoses,
has led to a massed attack upon the subject from
the chemical point of view. Comprehensive
summaries of these studies into the possible
physiogenic causes of mental illness have been
(12)
given in recent years by Goodall and
(13)
Langfeldt , and it is unnecessary for present 
purposes to consider these researches in their 
technical details* it is more with the mode of 
approach as a whole that this thesis is concerned. 
It is necessary, however, to consider some of the 
outstanding results which have emerged from this 
mass of investigation.
One of the most serious criticisms which can 
»/ be levelled at this pap4?*-ehemical attitude is that 
many psychiatrists with practically no chemical 
knowledge, training or experience, are tackling’
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the most abstruse problems of body-chemistry with
weapons which they are ill-equipped to wield. In
a few cases, however, a genuine biochemist or
physiologist has applied his methods to cases of
mental illness, with regrettably negative results
up till the present time•
One of the first noteworthy efforts in this
(14)
direction was the application by Pauser of
the Abderhalden test to so-called fdementia praecox1.
It was positive in many cases, indicating that
destruction of the sex glands was going on. This
work was supported by the histological and chemical
(15)
researches of Mott , who demonstrated aspermato­
genesis in the testicles of dementia praecox cases, 
and also regressive changes in the adrenal medulla, 
characterized by an increased number of nuclei, 
irregularity of nuclear forms and a deficiency of 
chromatin together with an increase of fibrous 
tissue. In the anterior part of the pituitary 
were found atrophy of cytoplasm and nuclear changes.
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All these changes Mott correlated with 
chemical and histological changes which he found 
in the brain, such as swelling of the cell-nuclei 
with disappearance of Nissl’s granules, destruction 
of cytoplasm and loss of dendrites, the appearance 
of lipoid granules in the cells of the cortex and 
basal ganglia, diminution of the number of oxidase 
granules and an increase of the neutral sulphur- 
content of the whole brain. Mott expresses the 
view that these changes indicate a general diminu­
tion in the oxidation processes in cases of dementia 
praecox.
Mott’s work has been criticized on technical
(16)
grounds by Morse and others. It is not 
disputed that these changes occur, but attention 
has been drawn to the fact that they also occur in 
patients who are not psychotic, but who are of 
similar ages to Mott’s patients and who have died 
of similar conditions, including a number of acute 
infections. It is certain that there is some 
clinical justification for the investigation of
29
the endocrine system in many patients. With the
advance of endocrinology it has been shown that
certain physical characteristics - such as type
of hair, nature of skin, bony formation, and so
on - are capable of being correlated with endocrine
changes. Many so-called ’dementia praecox1
patients show physical characteristics corresponding
with those attributed to endocrine changes, as 
(IV)
Kretschmer has pointed out.
Pari passu with this extensive search for
some endocrinopathy, certain observers clung to
the former tenets of psychiatry - namely, brain
physiology and pathology - but applied their methods
to Kraepelin’s clinical types. The most notable
(18)
of these are Alzheimer and Josephy , both of 
whom believe that dementia praecox is an organic 
brain disease because they invariably found 
degenerative cellular changes in the brains of 
dementia praecox patients. These changes are 
said to be of a non-inflammatory type - such as 
fatty degeneration, sclerosis and atrophy - and
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are found principally in the anterior portions of 
the brain, frontal and temporal lobes, in the 
third and fifth cortical layers. Cell-changes in 
the basal ganglia are also found. Josephy does 
not claim that he can correlate these anatomical 
changes with the symptoms of dementia praecox. He 
believes them to be toxic in origin, and this brings 
his work into line with Kraepelin!s concepts. The 
tendency of the majority of Kraepelin*s followers 
has been rather to neglect the brain-pathology and 
devote themselves exclusively to the chemical 
aspects of the great clinical groups which he 
described.
Of all the extra-neural pathological work 
which has been done, there is little doubt that 
that of Mott and the endocrine school, as described 
above, has, up till the present, been the most 
productive of concrete objective results, which have 
at least some clinical justification.
The latest effort of the endocrine school is
(19)
seen in the very comprehensive work of Langfeldt ,
31
whose work on the autonomic nervous system and 
the endocrine glands, utilizes a system of 
pharmacological * functional1 tests made by 
injecting various drugs, such as adrenalin 
and pilocarpin, and observing their effects 
on pulse, blood-pressure, pupillary reaction, 
salivation, etc.
Apart from this work on endocrinology, 
however, there has been a widespread investiga­
tion, bacteriological and metabolic, of these 
cases•
(20)
Cotton, Hunter, Pickworth and many others 
have extensively investigated the bacteria of the 
intestine, nasal sinus, tonsils, teeth, etc; and 
some of the writers of this school go so far as to 
describe a "septic psychosis”. These investigations 
are the application to psychiatry of a school of 
thought which was fashionable in general medicine 
for a time. It has been known for many years 
that gross infections and intoxications were 
capable of playing an important part in the
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production of psychoses. These psychoses, 
however, as Bonhoeffer showed, were character­
ized by Impairment of the intellectual functions. 
They were, in fact, "symptomatic psychoses”, as 
he called them. So far as the groups designated 
“dementia praecox" and "manic-depressive insanity" 
are concerned, however, the *focal sepsis1 advocates 
have not been able to produce any convincing 
evidence that occult sepsis plays an etiological 
part.
In any case, the criteria of the normal 
bacteriology of the parts which these observers 
were investigating are admittedly unknown by 
competent bacteriologists.
At the present time, the question of the
acid-base balance of the blood is arousing
considerable attention; and, so far, it has
emerged that many early cases of mental disorder
in young adults are associated with a degree of
acidosis. This work has been done principally
(21) (22) 
by Shera , Mann and Goodall •
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The psychological School.
Although the treatment of certain formas of 
illness in the far-distant past may, in a sense, 
be described as psychological, it was not until 
the middle of the 19th.Century that psychological 
conceptions were seriously put forward as an 
explanation of certain illnesses.
In 1843 Braid made a determined attempt to
sift the good from the bad in the rather doubtfully
scientific work of the French ’mesmerism1 school,
(24)
which had been flourishing for about a century .
He drew attention to a condition of "nervous sleep" - 
hypnotism - the phenomena of rihich are induced by"a 
continual fixation of the mental and visual eye upon 
an object with absolute repose of body and general 
quietude". As these phenomena may also be induced 
in the blind, Braid expressed the opinion that "it 
is not so much the optic, as the sentient, motor and 
sympathetic nerves and the mind, through which the 
impression is made". The phenomena which lie was 
thus able to induce were closure of the eyelids,
with some vibratory motion; loss of normal
consciousness; rigidity or cataleptic states
of the muscles, and some anaesthesia. His
explanation of the conditions was that ”the
equilibrium of the nervous system was destroyed”,
and that much of the effect was due to ”the power
of imagination, sympathy, and habit in producing
the expected effects on those previously
impressed”. Although his work was done carefully
and in an unbiased way, Braid’s views did not
find favour with the medical profession in this
country. Hypnotism languished for about forty
years, when interest in the condition was revived
(25)
by Charcot and Bernheim , who, in 1884, put 
forth the contention that the phenomena described 
by Braid were due to suggestion. Braid, of course, 
recognized the importance of suggestion, but did 
not say so explicitly. Bernheim showed that 
suggestion was a universal factor in mental life, 
that it was called into play constantly in the 
normal life of a normal individual, and that it
35
could produce results, including therapeutic 
effects, without the intervention of hypnosis,
Charcot noticed that in persons showing
certain nervous symptoms and signs after an
accidental injury, the physical accident in
itself was not the cause of the symptoms, hut
that a part was played hy the memories of the
accident. Finally, he propounded the view
that certain symptoms of hysteria were due to
(26)
”ideas” • As Hart says, ”with this view
was laid the foundation-stone of the psycho- 
pathological conception of hysteria, and here also 
we see the beginning of a delimitation of 
1 psychogenic1 from other diseases”.
Janet, working from the propositions which 
Charcot had put forth, so strengthened the 
arguments in favour of psychogenic1 illnesses 
as to render their position impregnable. He 
noticed that hysterical anaesthesia often had 
a peculiar distribution, quite out of accord
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with known anatomical nerve-distribution, but 
corresponding exactly with the lay patient1s 
"idea" of a certain part of his body (e.g., 
his hand).
He drew attention to another fact which 
widened and complicated the vista enormously.
It was noticed that, whereas patients suffering 
from syringomyelia with small patches of 
anaesthesia frequently suffered accidental 
injury, patients with large areas of hysterical 
anaesthesia very rarely sustained any injury.
The only conclusions possible from this were that 
the hysterical patient must ’feel* with his affected 
limb, which was anaesthetic on formal testing. In 
order to explain these facts, Jane$ devized the 
conception of "dissociation of consciousness".
The mind of the patient was, so to speak, split 
into two parts; two independent streams of con­
sciousness, each without knowledge or awareness of 
the other. Thus, the sensations arising from, say, 
a limb may be diverted into a current separated 
from the main stream of consciousness, thereby
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producing an anaesthesia. This subsidiary 
stream is, as it were, a little personality or 
fmindf in itself, which directs the activities 
of the limb independently of the main stream of 
consciousness, and unknown to it, thus enabling 
it to avoid injuiy . Such a hypothesis undoubtedly 
explains the clinical facts; it explains the 
apparent paradox that the limb is anaesthetic to 
formal testing; and yet it must be capable of 
feeling or it would not be able to avoid injury.
Janet also applied this concept of dissociation
to hysterical paralysis, somnambulism and other
phenomena; and he claimed that it fitted the facts.
If this hypothesis is true, then there remains the
question as to why dissociation should occur at all.
If it is the result of psychological forces, then it
(28)
must have some purpose; for purpose, as McDougall 
has argued, is one of the characteristic marks of 
mental life. Janet, in his early works, formulated 
the "how”, or mode of production, of psychogenic 
illnesses. It remained for Breur and Preud to
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formulate the !1whyn, or reason, for the
production of such illnesses,*
(29)
In 1895 Breur and Freud described 
a case of hysterical paralysis, in which, 
under hypnosis, the patient recalled an 
unpleasant incident, which in her ordinary, 
fully-conscious state, she had forgotten.
This incident had led up directly to the 
onset of the paralysis, and when recalled 
was accompanied by the unpleasant, emotional 
condition originally associated with it; after 
which, the paralysis ceased to exist.
From this time onwards, psychopathology 
began to take cognizance of the fact that 
emotion entered into processes, such as 
memory, which had previously been regarded 
entirely from the intellectualistic standpoint.
The patient forgets, or tends to forget, 
that which is unpleasant, because it is 
intolerable to his "better self”.
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Here, then, is a definite attempt to 
formulate the reason for the appearance of 
a hysterical paralysis - an attempt to make 
a symptom intelligible.
The case cited above was explained by the 
authors in a very simple fashion; there was an 
original ”psychic trauma” or incident which 
resulted in an unpleasant, emotional state, and 
was, therefore, repressed or apparently forgotten.
With the growth of his experience, Freud's 
formulations grew more and more complex; and it 
is not intended here to discuss the intricate, 
paychological technicalities involved any more 
than the chemical intricacies of the physiogenic 
school. Rather is it our object to extract from 
the literature of both schools such facts as are 
established and such hypotheses as are likely to 
be fruitful in arriving at some understanding of 
the psychoses of young adults.
One of the most striking facts about the 
psychological school is that two investigators - 
McDougall, starting from the viewpoint of the
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academic psychologist, and Freud, starting as a 
pure clinician - have, by very diverse methods 
arrived at conclusions which are fundamentally 
similar; namely, the large part played by the 
innate, instinctive tendencies in determining 
human behaviour - normal and morbid - and the 
fact that these tendencies are being constantly 
subjected to conflicts and inhibitions by each 
other, and by what McDou^all calls the "self- 
regarding sentiment”. It is held by the 
protagonists of this school that in individuals of 
a certain constitution these conflicts may be so 
unbearable to consciousness that they are 
repressed (i.e., forgotten), but not thereby 
exterminated or solved. They are merely 
"dissociated” from the main stream of conscious­
ness, and they constitute the "subconscious” or 
"unconscious". Then, for some reason - it may 
be that the warring, instinctive tendencies are so 
strong, or it may be that the repressing forces 
(i.e., the "self-regarding sentiment" of McDougall 
or the "censor" of Freud) are weakened by some
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external circumstance - the conflict bursts 
through into consciousness, but not in its 
naked, primitive form. It is disguised; its 
manifestation takes the form of a hysterical 
paralysis, a hallucinatory 1 voice”, or a 
delusional belief; any of which, in some way, 
”symboli3es” the conflict.
The mechanism of symptom-production, then, 
according to the psychological school, may be 
formulated broadly as follows•-
(1) A special constitution.
(2) Unbearable conflict.
(3) Dissociation of conflict from con­
sciousness and repression of it into the sub­
conscious.
(4) Weakening of repressing forces.
(5) Re-appearance of conflict in a disguised 
form in consciousness (i.e., symptoms).
It seems almost unnecessary to mention that the 
psychological school has been subjected to a storm 
of criticisms almost unparalleled in its bitterness.
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A closer investigation of this criticism is 
necessary. In the first place, Freud has 
shifted his ground a good deal since he first 
propounded his theories. This has evoked 
much criticism; hut critics have lost sight 
of the fact that, although Freud dropped the 
”psychic trauma’1 theory in favour of the 
’’Oedipus complex”, and that, in turn, in favour 
of the ”castration complex”, he adhered all 
through to the relationship between the 
instinctive tendencies and the symptoms. Such 
criticism as may be brought to bear on these 
grounds is valid only in so far as it applies 
to technical details of theory of the moment, and 
does not in any way attack the method of approach; 
namely, the investigation of the patient’s ’inner 
life”*
Further, many of the criticisms that have 
been brought to bear are directed not against 
Freud’s personal work, but against the work of
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some of his followers, in the mistaken belief
that these are synonymous with Freud for
practical purposes. Nothing could be further
from the truth, for it is notorious that few
investigators have been so misquoted, so little
read (in the original) and so subjected to
exaggerated abuse by their followers as Freud,
One of the critics who has tackled Freud
and McDougall, from the point of view 6f their
mode of approach to mental illness as a whole,
is Shaw Bolton, whose paper, 1 The Myth of the
(30)
Unconscious Mind” , is largely a personal 
attack upon Freud, apparently on eugenic grounds, 
in part ridicule; and finally a denial that 
there can be any such thing as a subconscious 
mind because (a) no one has defined it; (b) its 
existence is unlikely#
(31)
In another communication , Bolton criticizes 
Freud and McDougall in a mass of physical and meta­
physical speculation, not unmixed with comparative
neurology and morphology, which does not seem 
to deal strictly with the contentions of these 
authors.
Others, however, have attempted to hring the
essential Freudian principles into line with the
psychoses with which we are dealing.
(32)
Jung , for example, attempted to render
the symptoms of dementia praecox intelligible in
terms of psychology. It cannot be said that Jung
has explained dementia praecox, but it is apparent
that, in some cases at least, he has rendered
intelligible symptoms which would otherwise be
quite meaningless, no matter what their exact mode
of production, be it physiogenic ot psychogenic.
Jung showed that some form of psychology which
takes into account the patient*s instinctive and
emotional activities is an absolutely essential
part of the psychiatrist1s armamentarium if he
would fully understand the psychoses of young
adults. His attempts to formulate dementia
praecox in psychological terms has its counterpart
(33)
in McCurdy *s **Psychology of Emotion” , wherein
45
he attempts to explain the manic-depressive 
psychosis and involutional melancholia in 
terms of the unconscious wishes and fears, whose 
amotional accompaniments apnear in consciousness 
in an apparently false setting.
The Personality in Relation to Mental 
Illness,
Another important piece of work done by
Jung was to bring attention to bear on the
sort of people who become mentally ill. The
old classical types of temperament had stood
for years, and did not seem to be of any
practical value to the psychiatrist; but Jung,
(34)
in his ”Psychological Types” , developed this 
rough subdivision into definite, carefully- 
delineated personality-types, of which the main 
subdivisions were the now much misused 1 introvert* 
and ’extrovert* type of personality; and this was 
the starting-point for the extensive personality 
studies which were presently to engage the 
attention of psychiatrists.
(35)
Kretschmer made an extensive investigation 
not only of the personality or ”mental make-up” 
of normal and psychotic personalities, but he 
attempted to correlate his mental types with 
characteristic physical features. He delineated 
broadly two types - the ”schizothymic” and the 
“cyclothymic” - corresponding roughly to certain 
of Jungfs ‘introvert1 and ‘extrovert* types.
The former he found liable to develop dementia 
praecox types of illness, and the latter the 
manic-depressive type of illness. Wisely, he 
was not arbitrary in drawing hard and fast distinc­
tion between his types; rather, he implied that 
there is a gradually shifting scale with pure 
schizothymes at one end, and pure cyclothymes at 
the other; and this, of course, is quite in 
conformity with what is seen clinically. Kretschmer 
work, then, may be formulated as follows; individual 
conform to certain types of personality, more or less 
and when an individual breaks down mentally, he does
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so along the lines of his personality,
Kretschmer, however, was at heart a 
Kraepelinian, and was very loih to give up the 
arbitrary, clinical types - dementia praecox and 
manic-depressive insanity - of his teacher. It 
was becoming apparent, however, that this
distinction did not meet all the clinical facts;
(36)
and it fe%l to Bleuler to put forward a 
formulation which seems destined to fill a gap 
which exists in clinical psychiatry between the 
nosographical forms of Kraepelin and the psycholog­
ical explanations of other workers. The 
formulation of Bleuler!s method of approach is 
as follows:- when we meet with a case, we 
should not ask 1 Is it a schizophrenic1 (dementia 
praecox) *or an affective disordei?1 (manic- 
depressive insanity), but fTo what extent is it 
schizophrenic and to what extent affective?1.
Bleuler introduced the quantitative as well 
as the qualitative factor to psychiatry. He 
recognized, and stated explicitly, that in any
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individual there are potentialities for reacting 
to his environment along either of two lines. He 
may withdraw from reality into himself (schizo­
phrenic) or he may make good contact with his 
environment, at times launching forth into, at 
times being overwhelmed by, it (affective or 
syntonic or cyclothymic reaction type). In a 
case of mental illness it has to be determined to 
what extent the patient is reacting along each of 
these lines. Thus, Bleuler suggested a mode of 
approach to the psychoses which opened up wider 
vistas, more in consonance with observed clinical 
facts than any psychological method then put 
forward.
To bring Bleulerfs work into line with the 
present enquiry, then, it may be said that he 
recognized two clinical types of psychosis, one 
at each end of a scale, whilst in between were 
infinite gradations and combinations of the two. 
One type was 1 schizophrenia1, so called because 
its characteristic feature was a splitting,
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dissociation or disintegration of the functions 
which, in their coordinate whole, make up what 
we call the mind. The other type was the waffective 
disorder”, characterized by an exaggerated mood or 
1 affect* "most appropriate to the situation of the 
moment”. Each of these types occurs only in 
individuals of the corresponding type of personal­
ity.
In a further development of this theme it was 
shown that the doctrine ”an individual breaks down 
along the lines of his personality* was true not 
only of the ”functional" psychoses (dementia praecox 
and manic-depressive insanity of Kraepelin), but also 
of the organic.
For examples a patient with general paralysis 
will have, of course, the intellectual impairment 
characteristic of all organic conditions. In 
addition, he will have symptoms of disorder in the 
emotional field, affecting his moods and beliefs, 
and so determining, to a large extent, his behaviour. 
If he be of cyclothymic disposition, then we should 
expect him to be grandiose, expansive and full of
50
generous whims. If he be of schizothymic 
disposition (”Yond* Cassius hath a lean and 
hungry look, he thinks too much”), then we 
should expect him to be morose, susnicious and 
antagonistic - at any rate until dementia obscured 
the whole issue. It would seem that this hypo­
thesis is a possible and reasonable, but incom­
plete, explanation of the diversity of symptoms 
seen clinically - these ’atypical cases” which 
render so confusing the attempts of the text-book 
to ”pigeon-hole” a subject which in its very 
essence must be as protean as humanity itself.
It is, however, only part of the explanation; 
and, pursued to its logical conclusion, would 
have to answer the question, ’’What are the forces 
which determine the constitution of the personality 
of the normal individual?”. Its protagonists are 
quick to note this, and there is amongst them at 
present a determined effort to follow up their 
arguments by an intensive study of the ’’personality”.
This account, then, summarizes the diverse
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activities of a school of thought which has 
flown in the face of accepted medical convention, 
hut which, in its fundamental principles, cannot 
he ignored.
It would he well in closing this section to 
make clear one point oftan neglected hy its 
critics. It is this* the leaders of this 
school - Bleuler, Freud and McDougall, to name 
a few - have never stated that the "mind" is some 
sort of mythical entity. Many of them have 
expressed the belief that the phenomena which they 
describe have some - as yet undefined - ultimate, 
physical basis; but they do say that, in the 
present state of our knowledge, psychological 
and biological terms are the most convenient 
way of describing, thinking of, and explaining 
those problems of behaviour which it is our 
business to investigate.
The Works of Bianchl and Adolf Meyer.
Although not explicitly a follower of
(37)
Clouston, Bianohi , in his teaching, adopts such
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a wide method of approach to psychiatric problems 
that his work may be regarded as the direct con­
tinuation of Clouston*s methods, enlightened by 
extraordinarily careful histological and physiolog­
ical researches. Like Clouston^, Bianchi’s work 
rests on the solid foundations of anatomy and 
physiology; but, realizing that human behaviour 
cannot be profitably and completely explained in 
these terms alone, he blends them with sociology, 
environmental considerations, adaptations spoken 
of in biological terms, and, finally, with what 
may be termed ,!individual psychology” - tlse hopes, 
desires, experiences, fears, breeding and upbringing 
of the individual. For example? speaking of the 
”methods and field of clinical enquiry”, he says,
”It is our aim to translate the facts and laws 
of general psychology into what is known as 
individual psychopathology, since in each individual 
case the task of the physician is to reconstruct in 
mental synthesis the diseased personality in front 
of him, taking into account the social grade of
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each individual and the amount of instruction
received* S u c h ...... object... ... may be
obtained by (1) the psychological examination...
... of the patient; (2) the reconstruction of the
individual and family history; (3) ......  an enquiry
into the environment; (4) the anthropological 
examination; (5) the minute functional examination 
of the nervous system; (6) the examination of the 
entire organisms, taking into account the multiple, 
mediate and immediate relations existing between 
structure and function both of the cerebrum and 
of all the other organs inasmuch as all these in 
synthesis reflect the personality”.
Not only did Bianchi formulate these essential 
principles of approach, but he recognized, although 
he used different terms to describe it, the import­
ance of the ”inner life”, so much vaunted by the 
*
psychological school. Thus, he says, ”The 
illuminated field” (i.e., of consciousness)
”presents the conditions best adapted for maintain­
ing the contact of the ego with the external world 
and for utilizing through these relations the whole
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patrimony of the personality conserved in the 
non-illuminated part - that is to say, in the 
unconscious. In other words, the unconscious 
supplies to consciousness all the data of the 
individual history essential for useful 
adaptation of the personality to its environment.
The illuminated field is also a place of prepara­
tion of instantaneous syntheses and of new reac­
tions; but this work of synthesis is not uhknown 
to the more profound and obscure departments of the 
unconscious*”
Further* ”It is in unconsciousness that the 
formation of delirium are prepared and organized, 
that they assume associative relation and raise the 
potential of the sensory zones, producing hallucina­
tions as a result. ... ... The unconscious is the 
great architect of good and evil, of genius and folly 
and the majority of mental affections have their 
origin in it.”
Bianchi fully recognizes the ’’conflict” of the 
pure psychologists and seeks to place it on a
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physiological basis; and, further, he recognizes 
the”wi thdrawal from reality” also of that school.
It may truthfully be said, then, that Bianchi was 
fully alive to all those facts which the pure psychol­
ogists claim to have brought to light, but he 
formulated them in terms of mixed psychology and 
physiology and - perhaps for that reason - his 
work has not met with the reception in this country 
which it deserves; nor have his methods been adopted 
to an extent which would certainly have proved 
profitable in a better understanding of the psychoses. 
Put concisely, then: Bianchi adopted the wide method
of approach to the individual case, and attempted to 
reduce his ultimate explanations to physiological 
terifts.
(38)
Meyer is another psychiatrist who adopts a
broad viewpoint in approaching his cases. To quote
(39)
two of his pupils • nThis biological hypothesis 
regards mental illness as the cumulative result of 
unhealthy reactions of the individual mind to its 
environment, and seeks to trace in a given case all
56
the factors that go to the production of these 
reactions”•
In this formulation there are, undoubtedly, 
the same essential features as in other wide 
methods of approach. We have the ”individual” 
nature of mental illness, the dynamic conception 
of a ”reaction to environment”, and (implicitjry) 
a ”number of factors” which go to produce such 
reaction.
Possibly the most helpful point in Meyer’s 
method of approach to psychiatric problems, and 
that which renders it unique, is what one may call 
his unification of all the functions of the 
individual. This is essentially the doctrine 
of integration, which is that the individual is 
something more than the sum of his parts. He 
Is a hierarchy of functions, with something new 
emerging at each level until the highest of all 
is reached; viz., the mental level, which is 
the complete expression of the individual as a 
whole. This, once for all, does away with the
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old dualistic controversy of "mind” and 
"body” as a necessary part of psychiatric 
philosophy.
Meyer*s method of approach is to study 
developmentally the building up of the 
individual, to analyse and reconstruct the 
personality, and to consider it in relation 
to the situation which it is called upon to 
meet. This is the so-called psycho- 
biological viewpoint. Be it noted that 
this method takes everything into account, 
including physical changes, and recognizes 
no incompatibility between "functional" 
and "organic" pwychoses. Meyer does not 
regard the psychoses as disease entities, 
but as "reaction types"; and each case is 
essentially the outcome of factors peculiar 
to the individual, and, therefore, calls for 
a prognosis and management peculiar to 
itself •
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This, then, closes an outline account of 
those schools and aspects of modern psychiatric 
work and thought which may profitably be brought 
into relationship with the psychoses of young 
adults. It will be our business in the next 
section of this thesis to show how, in practice, 
a judicious combination of some or all of them 
may help in the elucidation and management of 
these illnesses. Before doing so, a summary 
of this historical survey is presented, so that 
we may have our data in concise form.
SUMMARY OF HISTORICAL ACCOUNT.
1. Pinel, Tuke and others, by their reforms 
placed psychotic patients under hospital 
conditions, and enabled them to be approached 
by physicians in the same manner as other sick 
people.
2. The nosographical methods of Sydenham 
were applied to these cases, resulting some 
forty years later in the delimitation by
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Kahlbaum of two clinical types of illness 
seen in young adults; namely, *katatonia* 
and fhebephrenia1. These were regarded 
by Kahlbaum as 1 disease entities1, but his 
views were much criticized (Palret and 
others).
3. Clouston regarded the 1 insanity of 
adolescence* as an entity in itself. It 
might take one of several forms, and there 
were no criteria by which one could foretell 
the ultimate result. Clous ton taught the 
importance of a wide viewpoint if an under­
standing of these cases was to be possible; 
and, while taking cerebral physiology as 
his fundamental basis, he pointed out that 
the psychology of the individual, his 
instinctive longings, his education and 
environment might all play a part in the 
development of a psychosis.
4. Kraepelin followed on Kahlbaum*s work.
He delineated fdementia praecox* and *manic-
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depressive insanity*, each with their sub­
divisions. He continued this method almost 
to the point of absurdity, so many and diverse 
were the types he described. It appeared 
that there were cases presenting mixed features 
of both these alleged entities. So far as 
young adults were concerned, he showed that 
almost any form of psychosis might occur in 
them; and each of these he sought to elevate 
to a definite disease entity. He believed 
that a toxaemia was responsible for the 
production of these conditions, and he 
produced a certain amount of clinical evidence 
in favour of this in some cases.
5. This led to the * toxic*, fphysiogenic1 
or ‘chemical* era in psychiatry, characterized 
by a great activity in the search for some 
1 substance* which would account for the 
symptoms. Much of the work was done in an 
ill-controlled manner by unskilled observers.
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The few positive facts which were arrived at 
by valid methods were: (a) Mott*s description
of degenerative changes in certain endocrine 
organs, evidence of disturbed metabolism and 
organic, neuronic changes; it has been pointed 
out by Morse that Mott did not take sufficient 
consideration of the clinical type of illness 
and its duration, the age of the patient, and 
the cause of death; (b) Langfeldtfs clinical 
evidence of disturbance of sympathetic 
function; (c) the demonstration by Goodall, 
Shera and others of disturbed acid-base 
regulation in certain cases.
Gross infection and intoxication have 
been shown to play a part in the production 
of psychoses - the Symptomatic psychosis1 of 
Bonhoeffer - but no convincing evidence has 
yet been produced which would justify the 
theory that focal sepsis plays an etiological 
part in the psychoses designated 1dementia 
praecox* and *manic-depressive insanity*.
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6. Braid, Charcot, Janet and others 
demonstrated beyond all doubt that 
psychological factors are capable of 
producing psychological, or even physical, 
symptoms, Janet formulated the concept 
of ’dissociation of consciousness1, and 
found that this hypothesis explained some 
symptoms in certain cases. Freud and 
McDougall drew attention to the part 
played by the instincts and emotion in 
the production of dissociation and, hence, 
of symptoms. Jung attempted to apply these 
concepts to dementia praecox, while McCurdy applied 
them to the manic-depressive psychosis; and each 
put forward a theory which rendered certain 
symptoms intelligible.
7. Jung drew attention to the two broad 
types of personality (introvert and extrovert), 
and showed that dementia praecox tended to
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develop in the introvert type.
8. Kretschmer enlarged this viewpoint. He 
demonstrated a gradually sliding scale of 
personalities, and showed that when an 
individual breaks down he does so along the 
lines of his personality.
9. Bleuler demonstrated practically the same 
facts as Kretschmer, and he formulated the 
question - to be asked in any given case - 
"To what extent is it schizothymic (or schizo­
phrenic), and to what extent manic-depressive 
(affective)?"; while he laid down certain 
criteria for each of these extreme ends of 
the scale.
10. Bianchi formulated his views in a wider 
manner. He sought in anatomy and physiology 
the physical basis of the psychoses; but he 
also emphasised the importance of the "individual 
psychology" - the unconscious, the environment, 
etc. He pointed out that the task of the 
physician was to "reconstruct in mental synthesis
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the diseased personality in front of him".
11. Adolf Meyer also adopted the broad 
viewpoint and method of approach. The 
essential features of his teaching are
(a) the doctrine of integration and (b) 
the psycho-biological viewpoint; and the
psychoses are regarded in terms of "reactions".
PART II 
THE ARGUMENT.
In this section it is proposed to produce 
evidence in support of our pvoposltlon, to 
formulate terms in which the psychoses of 
young adults may be rendered intelligible, 
and to pass in critical review the methods 
of approach of certain psychiatric schools of 
thought, extracting from each such facts and 
concepts as are likely to prove useful for 
our purposes.
As was pointed out in Part I of this 
thesis, the essence of the Kraepelinian method 
was careful description of symptoms in a vast
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number of cases, division of cases into groups, 
according to the similarity of their symptoms, 
and the labelling of each of these groups.
Thus, a number of clinical types are delineated.
Kraepelin demonstrated which clinical types 
tended towards recovery; recovery with probabil­
ity of relapse; and non-recovery. There were, 
respectively, the toxic exhaustive (acute 
confusion) psychoses, manic-depressive insanity 
and dementia praecox. In a word, he showed 
that there was a certain relationship between 
clinical type and ultimate result. He failed, 
however, to realize that a clinical type or 
group of symptoms is not necessarily the same 
thing as a disease entity. A disease entity 
implies a specific cause and a specific 
pathology. It has not yet been shown that 
any such specific cause exists In the psychoses 
of young adults.
The pathology of the conditions under 
consideration has not been reported as being
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constant or specific, even by the most com­
petent observers.
It has been shown that a variety of morbid 
physical changes occurs In many cases; but it 
has not been proved that these have any etiologi­
cal significance; nor have the organs which 
show these changes been compared with the corres­
ponding organs of non-psychotic persons of similar 
ages, and existing under similar conditions, to an 
extent which would justify our regarding them as 
specific. Conversely, it has not been demon­
strated that there is any disease entity in young 
adults of which a psychosis is a constant symptom, 
with the rare exception of juvenile general 
paralysis. On the other hand, it has been shown 
that many psychoses occur in the absence of any 
specific disease entity.
Let us suppose, for a moment, that the 
Kraepelinian method has found some specific 
cause and has demonstrated some specific 
pathology? would that explain the extraordinary
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diversity of clinical symptoms which we see? 
Emphatically, no; nor would it explain why 
some cases of apparent ’dementia praecox1 
end in recovery, and why seme cases of ’manic- 
depressive insanity’ end in dementia*
Let us take a concrete example; viz., 
dementia paralytica? here we have a specific 
cause and a specific pathology; we know that 
the spirochaete is destroying the brain; it 
is intelligible to us how this process leads 
ultimately to dementia - in virtue of our know­
ledge (such as it is) of cerebral physiology - 
but that does not explain *hy, in the early 
stages of the disease, some patients are 
elated, others facile, suspicious or hostile, 
why some have delusions of persecution, others 
of unworthiness, and others of grandeur.
Consider the case of a woman who develops 
a psychosi s during the puerperium. We 
commonly find that confusion is a prominent
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symptom. We have reasonably strong clinical 
and experimental evidence that this symptom is 
an indication of disturbance of the associative 
functions of the cerebrum. In other words, it 
is indicative of a definite physical disturbance. 
In addition to being confused, such a patient may 
be dull, irritable and suspicious of others; or 
she may “be profoundly depressed, expressing 
beliefs of her own unworthiness, and attempting 
to commit suicide; or she may be elated, over- 
active, and full of expansive schemes for the 
improvement of the world.
To say that these things are the result of 
poisoning of the brain does not render them 
intelligible.
It is remotely, if fancifully, possible that 
cerebral: localisation may become so exact, and 
our knowledge of the selective action of toxins 
so complete, that an understanding of the case 
along these lines might be achieved. In tte 
light of our present knowledge, however, this is
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not a justifiable conclusion; and it has the 
great disadvantage that it tends to make us 
think that we have explained the case, and to 
leave it at that, without utilizing all the 
means in our power of modifying other factors, 
which might have etiological significance and 
therapeutic value.
It is desirable to make clear at this 
J point that we do not in any way intend to 
disparage the painstaking efforts of those 
whose work is directed towards the elucida­
tion of the physical changes which take place 
in the psychoses; nor do we take exception 
to the search for some physical cause for 
such conditions.
We would point out, however, that such 
cause - if it exists - must operate on something; 
and that something is the living human being, in 
part or in whole, including that elusive aspect 
of him which we call the fmindf. Now a human 
being is not a fixed, static thing. He is
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living, ever changing, dynamic; and it is, 
therefore, valid to speak of the causes of a 
psychosis and that on which they operate as 
if they were forces. This being so, we may 
regard the phenomena which we wall the 
symptoms of a psychosis as the resultant of 
these forces.
It is quite illogical to attempt to 
understand the resultant by studying only one 
of the component forces. No matter how 
minutely we study a single component, we 
cannot explain the resultant unless we study 
the other components also.
For this reason, the search for some single, 
specific cause of a psychosis, even if it be 
successful, cannot explain the psychosis. It 
is necessary to know the nature of the subject 
in whom the psychosis develops; and this is 
obviously an individual matter, not only as 
regards the !mind!, but also as regards the 
peculiarities of body-chemistry and constitution
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generally.
The resultant (i.e., the symptom-complex), 
as we know from clinical observation, differs 
in detail in every case, so that, even if one 
component (causal factor) be shown to be constant, 
the others must be infinitely variable.
In each case, therefore, there is a different 
explanation of the symptoms.
Therefore, all cases must be approached 
individually.
The nosographical method of diagnosis is 
useful in so far as it enables us to communicate 
to others the kind of case we are thinking about; 
and, incidentally, to prognosticate in an empirical 
way. Such a method is essentially static. It 
consists in taking the symptoms as we find them at 
the time of examination, and comparing them with 
our concept of other cases showing similar 
symptoms. We are, however, dealing with the 
resultant of dynamic, ever-changing forces. Our 
aim should be to resolve the resultant into its
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components. Clearly, if this be a valid 
metaphor - indeed, it is more than a metaphor, 
for we are aware of no other terms which are 
more nearly capable of rendering our subject 
intelligible - we cannot so resolve the 
resultant by merely studying it at any one 
point in its path. Nor, for that matter, 
would it be of much assistance to study any 
or all of the components at any one point.
We must trace the resultant and each one 
of its component forces as far back as we can.
We must form some concept of when each component 
came into relationship with the individual; the 
amount of energy behind it; and the direction 
towards which it will deflect the resultant.
To know these things involves a process of tracing 
back the life of the individual, everything that 
has come into relationship with him, and their 
effects on him; and it involves a stuffy of his 
(individual) origin.
Thus, we have established that^ in order to
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understand the psychoses of young adults, the 
question must be approached individually; also 
that the individual case must be studied 
developmentally.
To complete the proof of the whole of our 
proposition, it is necessary to show that the 
case must be studied in all its aspects. To 
do this, we must define more closely what these 
aspects are. That is, we must enquire what 
components can possibly enter into our scheme 
of forces. These would apnear to be:-
(1) The Haw Material. - The individual as 
he was at birth.
Can we resolve this further? Undoubtedly, 
we can.
At birth, the individual begins a separate 
existence, endowed with certain potentialities. 
We want to know whether this endowment is 
average, whether, ab initio, there is some 
defect in his physical nature, or if we may 
infer, from a study of his ancestry, the
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probability of some of his potentialities being 
abnormal in some way. In a word, we want to 
know what he is made of.
(2) Developmental Forces. - We know from 
centuries of experience in the field of educa­
tion that the growing individual is an exceedingly 
plastic creation.
At first, the infant’s behaviour seems to be 
a mass of instinctive and reflex actions, which 
occur in response to appropriate aituations.
The emotions are near the surface - simple, 
easily aroused, and without controlling influence. 
The intellectual functions of memory and orienta­
tion. are not apparent for many months, and the 
higher function of inhibition does not appear 
until later still; whilst last of all does the 
highest function of integration, control and 
moulding of all these functions come into play.
It has been abundantly shown that the 
development oC these functions corresponds with 
that of the brain. It has also been shown that
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failure of development, disease of, or Injury 
to, the brain may, and usually does, interfere 
with the development of these functions. But - 
and this is the crux of the situation - it is 
not valid to argue from that fact that where we 
find disturbance of these functions, or inter­
ference with their development, we must, of 
necessity, have some physical disturbance of 
the brain. The fallacy of this argument is 
amply demonstrated in the clinical and patholog­
ical studies which have revealed the fact that 
such disturbance of function may occur in the 
absence of demonstrable brain lesion.
All that we are justified in saying, from 
our knowledge of the contemporaneous development 
of structure and function, is that the structural 
development renders the functional development 
possible. No reasonable person will deny that - 
apart altogether from brain lesion - physical 
ill-health, accident or deformity can, by 
restricting the field of activity, and in other
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ways, modify such development; and it is also 
apparent that such things as example, scholastic 
education and the inculcation of religious 
beliefs can profoundly modify the functional 
development of the individual.
It may be that these modifications have 
their neurological correlate, according to the 
"Law of Neural Habit", in the "channelling" of 
some particular cerebral pathways; it may be 
that by the minute study of the synapse the 
neurologists will be able to tell us precisely 
what is happening in the brain; but does that 
help us much? The all-important fact is that 
forces in the environment may completely modify 
the functional development of the individual; 
and, therefore, they must receive consideration 
in our scheme, not only, be it noted, as a means 
of explaining a psychosis, but also as a means 
of modifying its course. .
Now the study of the forces in the environ­
ment in which the individual has developed only
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helps us if we consider how they have modified 
the raw material. It may be that by their 
gradual cumulative effect they have brought 
about some psychosis of insidibus development; 
that is, they may have warped the functional 
development of the individual so that his 
behaviour has gradually become psychotic.
At all events, it is clear that in 
development of such a psychosis a number of 
conflicting forces have been brought to bear 
upon each other. The patient*s instinctive 
energies have had to submit to the obstructions 
of convention, religious beliefs, superstitions; 
and, as long as the balance between these 
things (i.e., the integrative function) is 
maintained, there is no psychosis. If, 
however, some greater obstruction occurs, or 
if the physical basis of the integrative 
functions breaks down, the resultant of these 
forces may be a psychosis.
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From the nature of these latter forces - 
namely, the fact that they are different in 
their intensity from the ordinary give and 
take of existence - we may, for convenience, 
group such forces as sudden physical illness, 
financial disaster, bereavement, or any other 
sudden mental stress, under a separate heading*-
(3) Precipitating Forces? and we see 
that these are of three kinds?-
(a) Environmental (financial disaster, 
bereavement, etc.)*
(b) Personal, Psychological Forces 
("conflict" - i.e., incompatibility
of desires and beliefs, or of ambitions 
and capabilities, etc.).
(c) Personal, Physical Forces (injury, 
disease or poisoning of the body as
a whole, and of the brain in particular).
To capitulate, then: the components which go
to make up our resultant are to be found in:-
(1) Endowed potentialities (raw material).
(2) Events in the environment which modify
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the development of these potentialities; the 
result of this modification being the 
"personality"
(3) The forces which the personality is 
called upon to meet (i.e., precipitating forces); 
and those may be in*-
(a) the environment;
(b) the psychological aspect of the 
individual;
(c) his physical nature.
Up till this point in the argument, we have 
been speaking of the psychoses as a whole.
When a psychosis is viewed in the way we 
have advocated, it becomes intelligible - if 
we know enough of the component forces - why 
a breakdown should occur at all. To vindicate 
itself, this argument must pass successfully 
the test of meeting and explaining actual 
clinical cases. We propose to illustrate 
this by reference to actual cases in a 
later part of this thesis.
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No doubt, long before this stage of 
the argument, the recollection of cases 
of apparently spontaneous psychoses will 
have presented itself to the reader. It 
is desirable, therefore, to indicate briefly 
how our scheme may meet even these.
The essential thing is that we should 
know enough of the component forces. It 
is such common experience as to need no 
actual example here that seme psychoses in 
young adults develop apparently ”out of the 
blue”. In our study of the family history, 
we may not alight on any fact which would justify 
us in inferring some abnormal endowment of 
potentialities (that, of course, does not 
necessarily mean that such abnormalities do 
not exist). Ou* study of the forces of the 
environment during the period of the patient’s 
development may show nothing unusual; there 
may not have been any apparent ”precipitating 
forces”; that is, the patient may not appear 
to have been called upon to meet any unusual
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or special obstruction to his progress; and, 
further, may be in apparently good health. Yet, 
his development diverts from the normal, and he 
becomes psychotic. How is our argument to meet 
such a case? It meets it by saying that we have 
not taken into account the personal psychological 
and physical forces. We must, therefore, 
consider these forces flurther.
Personal Psychological Forces,
Our study of a case may not show that anything 
unusual has happened in the environment; but, for 
all that, it is possible that even the usual run 
of events may have had an unusual effect on the 
patient. This, only the patient can tell us; 
we must know the subjective aspect of the case. 
There is nothing inherently unusual in an adoles­
cent youth being bereft of his parents; yet, 
such an event may very well precede the psychosis 
in the kind of case of which we are speaking.
Of itself, it does not explain the psychosis; 
but, if we know something of the youthfs 
attitude to his parents, we may -without evoking
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any truly Freudian principles - render the 
psychosis intelligible. It may be that he 
accepted his parents1 word without question 
in everything; that he subborned his own 
strivings to their wishes; that, in fact, 
he never trained himself to be independent.
He is suddenly called upon to declare his 
independence - a process which normally takes 
many years. Is it not intelligible how he may 
slip into a helpless, hopeless, apathetic, 
inactive condition, shunning the society of 
others? Perhaps, too, because of religious 
education he may believe that this bereavement 
is a punishment to him because of some real or 
fancied childish error which to him is a great 
sin (e.g., masturbation). Thus, although he 
may have been, objectively, a model child, 
obedient, unobtrusive, and so forth, and 
although his religious beliefs may be perfectly 
orthodox, the knowledge of his attitude to his 
parents, brought into relationship with his
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bereavement and religious beliefs, may go 
far towards helping us to understand his 
psychosis.
Such a situation is, however, very simple.
The patient, moreover, is fully conscious of 
the principal conflicting forces.
Can it be that there are other forces in 
the psychological constitution of the individual, 
of which he is not conscious?
In Part I we referred to the work of the 
psychological school. How much of that work 
may we accept as valid and directly applicable 
to our problem? Setting aside the differences 
in actual phraseology used by the different 
exponents of this school, we would say:-
(1) The concept of the unconscious seems 
to us a useful and valid one, in its broad 
sense, that we are unaware of certain of our 
own psychological activities.
We cannot agree with Freud, however, that
crude
the content of the unconscious is solely tmflgr 
sexual striving; nor can we agree with his
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elaboration of this theme - that such strivings 
properly belong to the periods of infancy and 
childhood.
(2) We can also useftally accept the concept 
of ‘repression*. There is no doubt that a 
person can *put thoughts out of his mind1; and 
there is no doubt that he does tend to fput out 
of his mind* thoughts which have reference to 
crude instinctive desires (not necessarily 
sexual) which are inacceptable to his ’better 
self*, or, as McDougall has it, to which his 
self-regarding sentiment is opposed.
(3) This involves the acceptance of the 
concept of ’conflict* of instinctive desires 
with one another and with inhibitions of all 
kinds.
(4) These conflicts may be conscious or 
unconsciouss, not in a sharply-divided way, but 
in the sense the subject may view them clearly 
in the sharp focus of full awareness,or dimly 
in the mists of wandering fancy.
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We must admit that the content of the 
unconscious can be a component in our scheme 
of forces.
Like the individual as a whole, the Content 
of the unconscious is not to be conceived as 
being a fixed, stated thing. It is a living, 
dynamic series of processes or forces, each, we 
may say, the mental counterpart of some biological 
mode of reaction, which is repressed or debarred 
from expression, perhaps, because it is inaccept- 
able to the individual as a whole; perhaps from 
fear of the consequences; perhaps from lack of 
the necessary vigour or energy to overcome the 
obstructions in its path.
Is it likely, if great biological forces - 
such as the reproductive or protective instincts - 
have once been aroused to such an extent as to 
require repression, that their psychological 
counterparts will lie dormant in the subconscious 
and exert no influence on the individual as a 
whole? Hardly so. There must be a perpetual
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warring between these forces in relation to 
each other, and in relation to the individual 
as a whole • Is it not intelligible how some 
such thwarted force may modify the whole life 
of the individual?
Is it not intelligible that the depressing1 
forces may be weakened by physical ill-health, 
or by some environmental disaster; or how the 
depressed1 forces may be stimulated anew by 
some extraneous event, and burst the bonds of 
their repression?
Is it not intelligible how such a force, 
denied for ever the possibility of achieving 
its purpose in reality may be so strong and 
insistent as to achieve it in phantasy, through 
its psychological counterparts?
Such phantasies undoubtedly have their 
neurological basis. That does not invalidate 
the terms in which we speak of them. We admit 
that the phantasies of psychotic patients are 
the psychological counterparts of repressed,
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instinctive forces; and we admit that such 
phantasies may he such as to disguise the real 
nature of the forces behind them* Then only 
do certain symptoms, particularly certain 
hallucinatory experiences, become intelligible* 
We do not accept to the letter the Freudian 
scheme of 1 symbol!sation*, but we do admit 
disguise of crude thoughts, and we seek the 
reasons for this disguise in the self- 
regarding sentiment.
Personal Physical Forces.
The symptom^ of confusion is such a 
constant accompaniment of disease, injury or 
poisoning of the brain, that its presence 
should always indicate a search for some major 
etiological force in the somatic field*
This search must be of the most detailed 
nature, and should, if necessary, employ all the 
armamentarium of the modern clinical chemist.
It would be out of place at this point to go
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into technical details. Some comment, however, 
seems necessary on the efforts of the 1physio- 
genic* school to demonstrate the presence of 
organic disease processes 4>n psychoses of which 
confusion is not a symptom - such conditions 
as simple states of depression or excitement or 
delusional states without impairment of orienta® 
tion, memory and retention. The exponents of 
this physiogenic school seem to be convinced 
that some * toxaemia1 is responsible for these 
conditions.
This naif conception is opposed to the 
law which states that the latest structure 
(and function) to be evolved is the first to 
be impaired when the organism is attacked by 
some toxaemia.
Now, from our studies of evolution, we 
know that the mental functions and their 
neurological counterparts developed in this 
orders- instinct and emotion; orientation 
and memory; inhibition of instinctive action; 
integration. We should expect, therefore,
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that if the neurological basis of these 
functions is attacked by a toxaemia, we 
should see derangement of them occurring, 
first as loss of integration, then as loss 
of'control (inhibition) of instinctive 
functions; then disorientation and loss 
of memory; finally, a failure of the 
emotional and instinctive functions• This 
order is followed precisely in the effects 
of such drugs as alcohol and chloroform on 
the brain and of such disease processes as 
that of dementia paralytica or poisoning 
by puerperal toxins. But in many psychoses 
we observe profound changes in the emotional 
nature, particularly in the way of the 
development of false beliefs (it has been 
demonstrated by McDougall and others that 
belief, particularly belief regarding the 
person and belief by suggestion are 
essentially emotional functions) without
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any disorientation or loss of memory, while 
the integrative functions do not seem to be 
in any way impaired. Such patients are 
neat, tidy, orderly; in a word, their 
personality1 is well preserved. Clearly, 
then, unless this toxin of the physiogenic 
school is absurdly selective in its actions, 
their hypothesis of toxaemia in this type 
of psyjhosis is not tenable.
With the endocrinologists the position 
is rather different. If they can prove 
that the endocrine glands are the physical 
basis of instinctive energy, they will have 
gone far towards the completion of our 
understanding of the psychoses, if their 
work is incorporated in a general scheme of 
1 forces1 such as we have outlined.
One final word to the exponents of the 
physiogenic school; in order to prove 
their case, they must show not only that 
toxaemia exists, but that it has etiological
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value. We have heard much cf Intestinal 
toxaemia. We do not dispute that it 
exists; but have those who seek to ascribe 
etiological value to it paused to consider 
that it may be the result of the altered 
diet, lack of exercise and mode of life 
generally of one whose behaviour is becom­
ing abnormal because of other things?
Have they paused to consider that such a 
toxaemia is readily amenable to treatment by 
ordinary medical methods as indeed are 
toxaemias from teeth, tonsils and appendices. 
We may clear up the toxaemia. We may get 
our patient into such a physical condition 
that the application of all our standard 
clinical methods reveals only that he is in 
robust health. He may live in an asylum 
that long healthy life which is such a 
constant accompaniment of the deluded state 
in which he is, whilst the autopsy which 
eventually follows reveals only the disease
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of which he died and the normal changes of 
old age.
The argument in support of our proposition 
is concluded. We have formulated terms in 
which psychoses may be rendered intelligible; 
namely, the concepts of a scheme of forces 
of which the psychosis is the resultant; and 
the etiological factors are the components.
We intend, as indicated, to confine oursives 
to the psychoses of young adults for purposes 
of this thesis.
PART III 
CLINICAL APPLICATIONS.
We have endeavoured to show in Part II 
that a dynamic view of the individual case 
is essential for the better understanding 
of the psychoses of young adults. It is 
proposed in this section to formulate a 
concrete scheme of approach to the individ­
ual case, to select a suitable nomenclature, 
and to illustrate by clinical records how 
our scheme of forces works in practice.
It was said, in Part II, that, in order 
to understand the scheme of forces, we must 
study (a) the resultant and (b) the 
components. Translated into clinical 
terms, this means a study of (a) the clinical 
picture and (b) the personal and family 
history. We should expect to find in (a) 
and (b) some indications of the major forces 
at work, and it then remains to unravel 
them.
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(a) The Clinical Picture.
(i) Method of making a record. The 
clinical picture should be a record of fact, 
not inference. Such an ideal may be 
achieved in only one way; namely, by writing 
down what the patient says and does, and the 
setting in which he says or does it. In 
other words, the case-record should consist 
of question and answer, and careful descrip­
tion of behaviour of the patient. Anything 
else is a matter of opinion, and only when we 
adhere to what the patient says and does are 
we remaining true recorders of actual fact.
Now fixed, scheduled forms of examination 
do not lend themselves readily to the descrip­
tion of such diverse things as the forms of 
individual human behaviour. The method of 
applying what is really the old 1 faculty 
psychology1 to clinical psychiatry and making 
notes under such headings as * the will1, !the 
moral sense1 is neither necessary nor helpful.
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It is, however, useful to recognize three 
facts and to group our clinical data under these 
headings. They are as follows:-
(1) Any individual thinks along more or 
less personal trends; i.e., he has a content 
of thought which is peculiar to himself.
(2) He has, at a given time, a certain 
emotional state which bears some relationship 
to his content of thought.
(3) He is capable of performing simple 
acts of reasoning.
In addition, therefore, to our description 
of the objective behaviour of the patient, we 
should endeavour to arrange our questions to 
the patient in such a way as to determine:
(1) The content of thought and mental 
trend."" What Is the patient thinking about? 
Does it concern itself with real or hallucina­
tory experiences? Are his beliefs generally 
accepted as correct or erroneous?
Apart from such definite components as 
hallucinations and delusions in the content
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of thought, we require to know what the 
trend of the thinking process is. Thus,
/ Vtfithout amounting to delusions, do the
patient’s thoughts tend to be self-condemnatory, 
or ambitious or grudging?
(2) The emotional state and its relation­
ship to the content of thought and mental trend.—
In spite of numerous attempts to draw up 
some purely objective, physical criterion of 
emotion, such as the ’psycho-galvanic reflex’, 
for clinical purposes we must at present be 
content with:
(a) The motor expressions of emotion 
(attitude, facial expression, gesticulation);
(b) The patient’s own description of his 
emotional state - his ’feelings’ or ’spirits*.
In addition to determining the emotional 
state itself, we should have some statement 
from the patient regarding his reason for bei*?g 
in such a state; e.g., ”Why are you miserable?”. 
”Because I’ve done something awful”. Here 
we have an emotional state and a mental trend
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of self-condemnation. This emotion and 
this trend are in consonance or 1harmony1 
with each other, and disintegration of the 
psychic functions is, therefore, not present.
We should push the enquiry further, with a 
view to discovering if his belief that he 
has done something awful is his way of 
explaining to himself his feeling of misery, 
or whether he came to believe in the first 
place that he had done some thing awful and 
was miserable because of that. In other 
words, we want to know which came first, 
the mood of depression or the false belief.
It is of great importance to determine 
whether the mood and the mental trend are in 
harmony with each other or not. As an 
example of disharmony between mood and thought, 
we have a patient who states that he is perfectly 
happy, and, with a smile on his face, demands 
that one should fdo away* with him.
Not only must we determine the congruity
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or otherwise of the mood and thought content, 
but if, in our conversation with the patient, 
or in our study of the history, we learn that 
there has been some definite precipitating 
situation, such as a sudden bereavement or 
financial loss, or unfortunate love affair, 
we must consider whether the mood is compatible 
with this or not. For example, one has seen 
states of elation and excitement follow upon 
the loss of a dearly beloved parent, and we 
must endeavour to unravel our component 
forces to explain how this can come about.
(3) The state of the intellectual functions.— 
This involves a study of the patientfs orienta­
tion, memory for recent and remote events, 
scholastic knowledge, and general knowledge of 
current events, ability to do simple tests of 
mental retention, calculations, and ability to 
detect absurdities in specially made up stories.
The methods of determining these things are 
so well known already that they require no
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elaboration here. Their importance lies 
in the fact that they tell us the clearness 
or otherwise of consciousness - whether the 
patient is fully alive to his surroundings, 
or whether he is really clouded and in a 
sort of day-dream, or even delirious state.
It now remains*
(1) to apply some name to the psychosis;
(2) to seek some indication of the major 
etiological forces at work.
(1) The name of the psychosis. - As long 
as this is standardized, it matters but little 
what name we apply. There is nothing inherently 
wrong with Clouston's term ’adolescent insanity1, 
except that the word insanity is unfortunate, 
because of the stigma attached to it.
'Adolescent psychosis' would be a perfectly 
justifiable term, but is too limiting as regards 
age. We can usefully go a little further tkan 
that in most cases. We recognize that there 
are some cases characterized clinically by
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disintegration of the mental fmctions, and 
others by excessive display of emotion; while 
there are yet others presenting a mixture of 
these features, Further, in any or all of 
these cases, clouding of consciousness, con­
fusion or delirium may be a prominent symptom.
For descriptive purposes, then, we may usefully 
recognize the following clinical types of 
psychoses of young adults:
Clinical Criteria. ___________   Names of Psychoses.
1. The Schizophrenic Psychoses.1. Disintegration of psychic func­
tions, particularly disharmony 
between mood and thought content.
2. Excessive display of any emotion 
which is in harmony with the con­
tent of thought and most appropri­
ate to the situation of the moment.
3. Persistent Hallucinations or 
delusions of a.personal nature, 
occurring without disintegration 
of the psychic functions and in a 
setting of clear, unclouded con­
sciousness.
4. Clouding of consciousness, delirium, 4. The Organic Psychoses:
2. The Affective Psychoses.
3. The Paranoid Psychoses.
amnesia, disorientation and other 
impairments of intellectual 
functions.
(a) Psychoses with organic 
brain disease.
(b) Psychoses with other 
somatic disease.
This is not a rigid subdivision of clinical types.
We really have a graduated scale of cases with 
pure schizophrenia at one end and pure affective 
disorder at the other. We must make allowance 
for the 'in-between* cases, ih ich, at one period 
of their course may resemble one type, and at 
another time another type, or which may present 
at the same time mixed features of schizophrenia 
and affective disorders. We could call such a 
case Schizophrenia with affective features1 or 
'affective disorder with schizophrenic features1, 
according to its proximity to one or other end 
of the scale. Further, it is correct to speak 
of an organic psychosis with schizophrenic or 
affective features,as the case may be.
The most important thing of all is that we 
should recognize that by attaching a name to 
the psychosis we have not rendered it intellig­
ible, nor have we implicitly forecasted its 
course. We should be quite clear that there 
is no hard and fast distinction between the
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types indicated above. They are merely names 
devised to enable us to communicate to others 
what sort of mental symptoms we are thinking 
of.
(2) The Indications of the major etiological
forces at work* - It is desirable to make clear
at the beginning of this passage that whatever
forces are indicated clinically to be of major
forces
importance, we must investigate all the TSB&afi, 
major and minor, before our explanation^ of the 
oase is complete* For clinical purposes, 
however, there is often strong indication of one 
force being, as it were, the dominating one; 
hence, we may be able to formulate, according 
to the particular force at work, a prognosis 
early in our investigation of the case, and to 
order our management of the case accordingly.
The first and most important thing is to 
determine whether the psychosis presents itself 
in a setting of Intellectual clearness or 
cloudiness.
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If consciousness is clouded - i.e., if 
the patient is in a confused or delirious 
state - we are justified in concluding that 
the physical associative apparatus (i.e., 
certain parts of the cerebrum) is the seat 
of morbid physical changes, either of the nature 
of organic brain disease or of the nature of 
some poisoning process.
We may take it, therefore, that some gross 
physical disorder is a major component force 
in the production of a psychosis of this 
clinical type.
If the ordinary routine physical examination 
reveals nothing abnormal, we should not be 
content; we must employ special methods directed 
to detect obscure neurological conditions and 
obscure infective or toxaemic processes. So 
far as the technical elaborations of these 
methods are concerned, we do not need to 
discuss them here. If need be, the whole
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battery of modern clinical research must be 
brought to bear on the individual case* The 
need for this is indicated, as already mentioned, 
by two things; First, the presence of intellect­
ual impairment as a symptom, and,second, the 
failure of ordinary clinical methods to detect 
organic disease* In such cases, lumbar
puncture should always be done* The examina­
tion of the cerebro-spinal fluid should include 
Wassermann, cell-count and colloidal gold 
reaction* The fundus oculi should be 
examined, and the visual fields too. If these 
dxaminations reveal no evidence of neurological 
disease, then attention must be turned to the 
rest of the somatic field. Assuming that 
ordinary clinical examination has detected 
nothing abnormal in this field, it is desirable 
to make a complete blood count. Particular 
attention should be paid to the differential 
count of the white blood corpuscles as a 
possible indication of a focus of infection.
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This, in time, would lead to examination of the 
patient’s throat, nose, ears, teeth, and genito­
urinary tract, amongst other possible foci of 
infection. If the question of ordinary common 
septic infection can be ruled out, then evidence 
of recent febrile states, such as typhoid, 
malaria, and so-forth, should be sought.
If nothing bacteriological can be found, 
then metabolic diseases, such as certain forms 
of nephritis, diabetes, gout, and all toxaemias 
associated with pregnancy should be looked for. 
These involve the use of the latest blood- 
chemistry and urine-chemistry methods. The 
next possible source of orgahic factors is in 
the exogenous poisons,such as alcohol, certain 
drugs, lead, phosphorus, and so on.
Such, then, is a brief outline of the 
methods of investigation to be adopted in the 
organic group of psychoses. Thatyis, those 
psychoses where intellectual impairment is a
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symptom and a pointer to the major etiological 
forces being found in the somatic field.
Supposing that intellectual impairment is 
not found; where, then, should the major 
etiological forces be sought, and what are 
the pointers that lead us to them?
The examination of the patient1s mental 
trend and content of thought should be 
considered next. Is there any topic which 
tends to be dominant? Does the patient harp 
on some environmental disaster which has 
immediately preceded his illness, or on some 
great personal changes in his circumstances, 
such as marriage or religious conversion?
Is his content of thought mainly concerned 
with what may be called his ’inner life* - 
ideas of sin, religious exaltation, marital 
infidelity, or the sex-topic in general? In 
some patients, of course, the content of thought 
is very wide, as manifested by a diffuse stream 
of talk, jumping from subject to subject; but
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even here, if a careful verbatim record of the 
patient’s spontaneous talk has been made, it 
is usually found that same topic is dominant.
Having found which is the dominant mental 
trend, the next thing is to investigate this 
as fully as possible. This brings us to the 
consideration of the history of the case. A 
history taken from one person does not usually 
cover all the ground. We must get to know the 
patient from several angles. We should, if 
possible, have a statement not only from near 
relatives, but from employers, workmates, 
personal friends, private physician, and so- 
forth. It is in this extended history-
taking that a social service, as managed by 
most modern psychiatric clinics, is so 
essential.
The family history gives us some idea of 
the raw material, as it were. The history 
of the development of the individual leads up
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to a description of the personality of the 
patient before he became ill; and the story 
of his life tells us of the situations which 
he was called upon to meet. Thus, we know 
the equipment of the patient and the factors 
with which he had to deal; and so we get a 
dynamic conception of the case.
If there was some environmental happening
which upset the patient, the next step is to
diseuss this as fully as possible with him
and endeavour to find out why he should be so
upset by it. The reason for this generally 
?
hangs on the patient’s mental attitude to 
himself and to the world about him. This is 
so essentially an individual and personal 
matter that it is idle to attempt to enumerate 
or classify the possible factors which may 
play a part. * It is this type of case which 
illustrates the dynamic conception of mental 
illness so well. The illness is essentially 
a reaction £o a situation; and the management
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of the case should be an attempt to alter the 
patient’s mental attitude and to re-educate 
his affective dispositions so that he may 
meet matters in a more philosophical way.
If the history has not indicated any 
environmental happening which could be regarded 
as an etiological factor, we must return once 
more to the examination of the mental trend and 
content of thought. We have, thus far, 
eliminated gross physical disease and environ­
mental disaster from the possible major etiologi­
cal forces. According to our scheme, there 
remains only some ’inner difficulty’, some 
essential maladjustment, as a major cause of 
the psychosis. To find this involves long, 
intimate talks with the patient, taking into 
consideration the general nature of the mental 
trend, the hallucinations or the delusions. Are 
these in the main sexual, self-accusatory, 
grandiose, or what? According to the topic 
indicated, we should guide the patient so as 
to disclose his inner conflicts and difficulties.
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What Is he trying to grapole with? Is he so 
sensitive that he cannot bring himself to seek 
aid on some intimate matter, but must needs 
attempt to deal with it himself, possibly ill- 
equipped to do so? The elucidation of such a 
problem may take months; success depends upon 
our ability to make the patient talk, and for 
this reason slow and gentle inspiring of confid­
ence is to be aimed at rather than any attempt 
at bullying or forcing a statement from the 
patient. We want the patient1s own version of 
his life, his hopes, fears and ambitions; the 
way in which things, apparently trivial to some 
other person, affected him personally.
Again, our aim should be re-education of 
the patient’s mental attitude. For its success, 
such a plan demands that these investigations 
shall take place early in the course of the 
psychosis. We know how very easily habits 
are formed. Psychotic modes of thought and 
behaviour soon become habits with a patient;
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and once such habits are firmly formed, it is 
unlikely that any amount of re-educative efforts 
will break them. For this reason, it is
essential that the psychiatrist should be brought 
into contact with the early case. Hence the 
need for legislative reforms and the development 
of psychiatric clinics, particularly in this 
country, which seems to be so far behind her 
psychiatric competitors abroad.
It would appear from the above remarks that 
early diagnosis is the thing to aim at; and 
this can only be achieved by a better psychiatric 
education of the medical profession and the 
removal from the lay mind of the stigma, with all 
its policy of concealment, which they attach to 
mental illness.
Illustrative Cases.
Case 1. Illustrating a complicated reaction 
to a situation, and the danger of empirical 
prognostication.
Miss W.T., aged 32, a salesgirl, was admitted 
to the Glasgow Royal Mental Hospital on 13/10/26.
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She was said to have been ill for 4 months, and 
had already been for 3 months in a Mental Hospital
and had a coated tongue, there was no abnormality 
to be made out in her physical condition.
She was in a state of considerable excitement, 
smiling, grimacing, rolling her eyes, and mutter­
ing unintelligibly to herself. She constantly 
changed her position, and made bowing movements.
She fell voluntarily to the floor in a silly sort 
of way. Conversation with her was very difficult. 
The following is an example of itr-
Q. "Do you Rnow what place this is?”
A. 111 didn!t expect so much for a title; ... it
seems so humble to do that” (shifting to and
fro on her seat); "I’ve got to do this."
Q. "Who tells you to do it?"
A. "I didn’t think you’d like that at all."
She named the day of the week correctly, but 
her answers to other questions, put with. a view 
to estimating her intellectual sta‘ were
at R- • Beyond the fact that she was thin,
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irrelevant, as shown above.
For some days she was unresponsive, giggling, 
grimacing and inco-op8rative. While still in 
this excited state, she was persuaded to attend 
the Hospital dances. She danced well, hut was 
answering tfthe voices” all the time. Oddities 
of behaviour were marked; she would slide on to 
the floor, and wave her legs about; she stated
that she was Lady G- •
About one month after admission, the excite­
ment began to abate, and, although still foolish, 
hallucinated and impulsive, she was more accessible, 
and it was possible to learn something of her 
content of thought. The most prominent feature 
of this was that she heard the voices of her 
mother, father and brother calling her; and she 
believed that her brother was in the next ward.
A month later, there was a further access of 
excitement, and little more could be got from 
her in conversation. Six months after admission,
she began to improve. She put on weight; became
£
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careful of her appearance, neat and orderly in 
dress. Eight months after admission, she 
was very much improved, and was able to discuss 
her illndss in a detached way. She said she 
knew that she had been very ill, but remembered 
practically nothing of her illness. She 
believed that the shock of her motherfs death 
had made her ill. She stated that she used to 
lean heavily on her mother; she went to her 
with every little trouble, and never really broke 
the childish btmds.
She was di scharged recovered 8i months after 
admission. I had an opportunity of seeing her 
at the Western Infirmary Psychiatric Clinic three 
months later. She was bright, steady,and sure 
of herself, and apparently quite well.
The history of this case is as follows •- 
the patient came of good stock, and developed 
normally through the infantile and school periods. 
She displayed no neurotic traits. She was a
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child with initiative and a great capacity 
for make-believe, being perfectly content to 
play with her toys and to !!bulld castles’1 •
She got on well with other boys and girls, and 
was a prizewinner at school* At the age of 
14 she entered a thread mill, did well, and 
rose to be an Examiner1. After this, she
entered a drapery store, where she had been 
employed for 8 years prior to her illness*
Her medical history was uneventful* She 
had had pneumonia at the age of 7. As an 
adult she was a good, steady worker, affection­
ate, and a home-lover* She had * turned down 
a good man1 because she fhad a good home and a 
good situation1. She was not, however, 
prudish or priggish, and was fond of children. 
She was beloved of all* People used to go to 
her with their troubles. She was fond of music 
and dancing, and was considered the life and 
soul of the party* The one unusual thing which 
stood out in her personality was her attitude
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to her mother. This was genuinely childish. 
Even as an adult she slept with her mother. 
They used to lie with their arms round each 
other. She was absolutely trusting and 
confiding to her mother, and showed strong 
sentiment in regard to her.
The patient's illness began when her 
mother was billed in an accident, in January, 
1926. Immediately after this, the patient 
was so upset that a doctor was called in. 
Looking up at the ceiling she would say, "I'll 
not be long here. I'll soon be smiling."
Her condition was not helped by some well- 
meaning but misguided friends, who chaffed her 
about this behaviour. The patient said, "I 
wonder you take this so lightly". She said 
she saw God on the roof. This episode
passed off after fourteen days, and nothing 
further was noticed about the patient until 
June,1926, when she began to read the Bible 
to excess. She bought a biblical dictionary,
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and was a keen follower of explanations of 
Biblical events. She talked of what Christ 
had suffered. While at work she went into 
another department and stated that two of 
the employees were cohspiring against her.
She evidently made a scene, and was taken 
home by her father. For three days she 
was hallucinated, tried to take off all her 
clothes, and stood in the crucifixion 
attitude. She stated that she 'had to make 
a sacrifice*. She kept on repeating, "God, 
God, God, God". She did not take food, and 
did not sleep. Sometimes she spoke only in 
whispers. She would stop In the middle of a 
sentence, and go on to speak of something else. 
She took off her stockings, saying, "I hate 
black". She cvied for "Jimmy" - the man whom 
she had 'turned down*. She squatted down in 
the drawing room in mixed company and passed
water. She was taken to the Hospital at R -
in June,1926, and a report from there shows
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that her condition was much as described 
above.
Comment.- This is a case where a psychosis 
follows a precipitating situation - the death 
of the patient's mother. This bald statement 
in Itself does not, of course, explain the 
psychosis.
When we consider, however, that by her own
admission, and from the observations of other
very
relatives, she had a xaextfxscwsccurious attitude 
to her mother, the explanation becomes clearer.
A woman of 52 habitually sleeps with her 
mother in a close embrace. She runs to her 
mother with everything; she'turns down' a 
good man because she prefers her home and her 
mother. In other words, Tihe patient's mother 
occupies the same position in her affection as 
she did when the patient was an infant. This 
woman has never learned really to'fend for 
herself*, so far as the more intimate side of 
her life is concerned. The mother is the main
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support of the patientTs emotional life. This 
support is suddenly taken away, and immediately 
we see all the childish capacity for make-believe 
(known to be a trait dm the patientfs character) 
coming into play. ”1*11 not be long here. I111 
soon be smiling”. She fhas to make a sacrifice1. 
Obviously, the mainspring behind such expressions 
is the wish to be with her mother; i.e., dead.
Then we get a partial readjustment, an attempt 
to !make the best of a bad job1, and we find the 
patient crying for ”Jimmy” - the next person in 
her affections. Coincidently with this is a 
wish to forget the motherfs death, and she tears 
off her stockings, saying, ”1 hate black” (the 
symbol of death). Then comes a great excitement, 
and behaviour of a truly childish kind (giggling, 
wetting Hil floor, and so on).
In the clinical picture we see obvious 
pointers to the major etiological factor when 
we study the content of thought - hallucinatory
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voices of the dead mother, and the belief 
that the mother is with her. Because the 
original endowment of the patient is good - 
she comes of good stock, and had made a good 
external adjustment to life - the patient is 
able to survive and readjust to a crisis which 
she should have gone through nearly twenty yvars 
before - and then over a period of years instead 
of days - namely, the breaking of the childish 
emotional bonds between mother and daughter.
One other comment on this case? it 
illustrates excellently the danger of the 
empirical method of diagnosis and prognosis.
On the face of it, with the hallucinations, 
foolishness and wetting, the case falls into 
the dementia praecox group, and as such is 
implicitly given a hopeless prognosis. This 
case illustrates the great importance of 
taking all the factors into consideration, 
and regarding the case from a dynamic viewpoint.
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We must give it a name. Clinically, there 
was a true splitting or dissociation of the 
psychic functions - a temporary disintegration, 
in fact. It would, therefore, be valid to 
call this case one of schizophrenia.
Case 2. Illustrating a more complex 
series of etiological factors, and showing 
how a careful study of the clinical picture 
points the way to their elucidation.
A) young girl, a domestic servant, aged 19, 
was admitted to the Cardiff City Mental Hospital 
in December,1927. She was elated, overtalkative, 
laughing and keeping up a running commentary of 
everything that was going on around her. "Clang" 
associations were prominent, the patient calling 
out, for instance, "Fire fere, diarrhoea”, and 
laughing loudly.
She stated that she was "as happy as she 
could be1. She was quite inco-operative in 
ordinary examination.
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Physically, there was an exudate from the 
tonsillar crypts; foul breath; a pultaceous 
abdomen, and general exaggeration of the tendon 
reflexes. Otherwise, no gross abnormality was 
made out.
When seen again a few days after admission, 
she stated that she fsaw horrible things at 
night*, and that she f,heard mummie*s voice calling” 
her ”name”. Her memory for remote events was 
good, but she was qiite unable to recall more 
recent ones, such as her admission to Hospital.
She was disorientated, and unable to giTBB a 
satisfactory account of the past few days. She 
recognized and admitted that she was unusually 
1keyed up* and emotional, and that she was talking 
a great deal. Real insight, however, was 
lacking, for, on seeing me again, she cried out, 
”0h, what you did to me last night! You gave me 
a *I«cky Dream* cigarette and operated on me.
Oh, God, this is awful. The things I see when 
I shut my eyes.”
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This state of excitement continued until
March, 1928, when it abated somewhat, and it was
possible to enter into more satisfactory conver-
%
sation with the patient. Speaking of herself, 
she said that she had not been happy at school, 
because she felt that everyone hated her.
Q. "Did you feel that you were not as good as 
others?"
A. "Always."
Q. "Why was that?"
A. "I thought I was ugly, to give you a plain 
fact, and others were jealous because ® 
was deemed better than them. I had long 
curly hair and the boys used to pull it. 
Instead of crying I used to hit them.
The men teachers made a favourite of me, 
and this made the women jealous because 
they were their sweethearts."
Q. "Why did you think you were ugly?"
A* "I was always called fugly duckling* by 
my cousin."
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Patient went on to tell how her father had
been head gardener to Lord I- , and had taken
ill - chronically - so that he had to give up 
his position. Her mother then tried to run a 
little shop, but became bankrupt, and the whole 
family had to move to relations in Cardiff.
They were greeted at the station by patient's 
aunt and cousin, and the latter when he saw 
patient (then about 12) said:
"Ugly duckling, ugly duckling, quack,quack,
quack,
" Go to the Devil and don't come back."
When she got to this atage of the narrative, 
patient burst out with great emotion, "I hate 
Cardiff and everything in it". Calming down, 
she said that she 'always found reasons for 
hating Cardiff', but in the 'background of her 
mind' she 'vaguely pictured that scene at the 
railway station every time*.
For a long time she had been made to feel 
that she was a 'charity child'. Gradually 
her mother re-established their position, and
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her father was able to find employment once 
more* Patient was then sent to a Protestant 
school, but happened to be living in a district 
where most of the children were Roman Catholics. 
The Catholic children used to throw stones at 
her. She said that fchis!made her feel that 
people hated her1 and that she was fno good*.
When asked how long that feeling lasted, 
she said, !lITve still got it", and then (with 
great emotion), "Since mummiefs gone I feel I 
could lie down and not get up again". (Her 
mother had died in Jul3wtl927 - see history 
below)•
She said that all her boisterousness and 
jollity were forced, and were just to make up 
for all the unhappiness that she really felt.
9 By May,1928, patient was again as excited as 
she had been on admission. This excitement 
continued for 6 weeks, and in July,1928, she
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developed signs of acute appendicitis. She 
was operated on, and a distended, acutely 
inflamed, retrocaecal appendix was removed, 
there being abundant evidence of long-standing 
inflammation in the adjacent parts.
After the operation, patient was very 
acutely excited - more so than before. This 
abated, and fluctuations in her mental state 
continued for some months. She was not 
making satisfactory progress. She continued 
thus until February^l929, when, on account of 
persistent exudate on the tonsillar crypts, 
her tonsils were removed. After this, there 
was a brief, final 1flare up* of excitement, 
lasting only a few days, and the patient made 
an uninterrupted recovery, leaving Hospital An 
May, 19 29.
The previous history of this case was as 
follows}- The family history was negative for 
nervous and mental diseases. Patient was,
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apparently, a healthy, aggressive child, mixing 
freely with others, and being in a class ahead 
of her years at school. She was boisterous 
and excitable, full of fun, but at times very 
quiet.
The acute phase in her illness began in 
December,1927, a few days prior to admission. 
She had been nursing her mother for about six 
months, until the mother died in July,1927. 
After that, the patient was frequently seen 
studying books, and she expressed a desire to 
be a nurse. Apart from this rather quiet and 
seclusive behaviour, nothing was noticed until 
the acute phase began. She became fkeyed up* 
and overtalkative. She said that she had
dreamed that she saw her mother, who, in the 
dream had said she (patient) would win a 
prize-drawing in a newspaper competition.
After this, she became expansive, and wwanted 
all the Church people to some and hear the 
glad news’*. She expressed a desire to send
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presents to all the poor children in the 
district. She was elated and apparently 
happy. When arrangements were made to 
take her to the workhouse observation ward, 
she appeared attired in a dance frock, and 
announced that she was going to be married 
that afternoon; and that she had come into 
a great deal of money, and was going to 
send her brother to college.
Comment. - Three major etiological forces 
fctand out in this case. They are?-
(1) An environmental disaster (death of 
mother);
(2) Personal psychological forces (ideas 
of ugliness and inferiority);
(3) Physical ill-health (appendix and 
tonsils);
and these
are being brought to bear on a personality which 
ie excitable and easily upset; which reacts with
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a vivid affect to the situation of the moment - 
in a word, the syntonic personality.
It is of the greatest importance to note 
that, as seen at the time of her admission to 
Hospital, and shortly afterwards, one of the 
most striking clinical features in this patient 
was the impairment of the intellectual functions. 
She was disorientated; teer memory for recent 
events was so impaired that she could not 
remember being admitted to Hospital; she confabu­
lated. As was pointed out in the Historical 
Survey, intellectual impairment has been shown 
to be an almost infallible criterion of actual 
disease, injury or poisoning of the brain.
tyuS
Following out plan of clinical approach, 
what could we find in the physical state of 
this patient which might be of etiological 
importance? Admittedly,not a great deal.
Her tonsils were infected, her breath was 
foul - that was afcout all there was on the 
surface.
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Bearing in mind our warning to the ultra- 
physiogenic school of thought, had we any 
right to ascribe causal significance to this 
apparently mild septic state?
We would formulate our answer to such a 
question as follows:- the mental symptoms pointed 
unequivocally to the*® being some important 
physical factor at work. Routine examination 
showed that the tonsils were unhealthy. There­
fore, they must, in this case, be suspect. Had 
there not been intellectual impairment, then 
there would have been no justification for 
ascribing major importance to the physical 
condition.
At first, the patient was considered much 
too excited to risk operating on her. Then, as 
a surprise, came the acute appendix, demanding 
urgent operation, which revealed old-standing 
trouble - further justification of our belief 
in some important physical forces in this 
case. But not until the tonsils were removed
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did the patient recover. Whether *post hoc 1 
or 1proptt»-hoc1 we do not know, but in this case 
there is some justification for believing it to 
be 1 prep!4-s hoc1. Admitting then,' the major 
importance of physical forces in this case, how 
does a study of other factors help us ti> under­
stand it?
Take the girl*s own conversation. She always 
felt *ugly* and fno good*. She felt other children 
at school were against her (apparently with some 
justification). She longed for joyful companion­
ship, yet she had to be content with being a 
fcharity child*. What strange conflicts must 
such conditions have set up in this adolescent 
girl. After months of strenuous nursing by 
patient, her mother dies. The girl has lost 
one of the few supports she had in what was to 
her an antagonistic world (**I hate Cardiff and 
all that*s in it1*)# It hardly demands any 
abstruse psychological delvings to appreciate 
why this simple, sensitive, imaginative child
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should dream, after a period of simple reactive 
depression, that her mother tells her that she is 
going to win fortune in some newspaper competition. 
Would not that go a long way towards solving her 
difficulties and realizing her ambitions? A 
simple matter of a conscious wish being fulfilled 
in a dream. Then the true dynamic viewpoint 
must be taken. We must not consider this dream 
as a static thing, complete in itself and detahhed 
from the patient*s life. We must consider its 
effect on the patient and her reactions to this, 
experience. Bearing in mind her emotional state, 
engendered by the death of her mother and her 
environmental oppression, what is more natural 
than that she should take this dream as a good 
omen and talk expansively of what she would do?
Add to this some toxic episode, and it seems 
that our explanation of the psychosis is as 
nearly complete as we can make it.
For descriptive purposes, one would call 
this an organic psychosis with affective features.
134
W© are aware that McCurdy (according to his 
’Psychology of Emotion1) would probably explain 
this psychosis on a different basis. He would 
say that the state of elation was the conscious 
concomitant of a subconscious wish-fulfillment; 
viz., the death of the mother, who, it would be 
suggested, was obstructing in some way the 
instinctive strivings of the patient, these 
being represented in the expansive talk and so 
forth ^lich characterized the onset of the 
psychosis. This, however, seems to be an 
unnecessarily recondite explanation; and, 
moreover, there is no evidence that the mother 
was obstructing the patient!s instinctive 
strivings. In this case, at any rate, the 
superficial explanation is the one which no$ 
only fits the facts, but is actually supported 
by them on every hand.
There is one other lesson to be learned 
from this case. It concerns the personality 
of the patient before she broke down. Her
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father stated that she was bright and cheerful - 
a good *mixer*, and apparently perfectly happy 
save for transient periods of quietness, to whihh 
he did not attach any importance. But we have 
it from the patient that she was, in fact, far 
from being happy; that she felt her position 
keenly; and that an incident which her father 
laughed off had had a far-reaching effect upon 
her (the !ugly duckling* incident); so that her 
outward appearance was a conscious effort to make 
up for her inner discomfort.
Again, therefore, we would emphasise the 
importance of the subjective aspect of things.
It is not the events in a patient*s career that 
matter; it is what they mean to the patient that 
is all important. The attempt to make psychology 
and psychiatry the study solely of objective 
behaviour can never lead to an understanding of 
the conditions with which we seek to deal.
*****
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